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Abstract
This paper explores the role of incentives in providing goods and
services that have signicant social returns not captured in private
returns which tend to be in environments where outcomes and perfor-
mances are not easy to measure, and pro-social motivation plays an
important role. We discuss how the presence of pro-motivation among
agents involved in the provision of these goods and services changes
the design of incentives. The paper also emphasises how heteroge-
neous pro-social motivation puts a premium on selection of agents in
this context. We also discuss alternative theories of pro-social motiva-
tion.
Draft of a paper prepared for the Annual Review of Economics, Volume 18. We thank
Jay Eui Jung Lee for outstanding research assistance.
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And hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for our-
selves, that to restrain our selsh, and to indulge our benevolent
a¤ections, constitutes the perfection of human nature; and can
alone produce among mankind that harmony of sentiments and
passions in which consists their whole grace and propriety.Adam
Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759 part 1 chapter 1.
1 Introduction
One of the central functions of e¤ective polities is to organize the provision of
goods and services which have large social returns above any private returns.
If left to market-based price incentives, they will be under-provided. This
underpins the traditional belief that markets are the most e¢ cient way of
producing private goods, while the government takes care of public goods
and services while also correcting a range of market failures.
This view is no longer tenable for, at least, two reasons. First, a large
body of evidence has accumulated on government failure due, for example,
to corruption, waste, absenteeism, and poor quality of service.1 Second,
the increasing importance of private social-sector organizations such as non-
prots, NGOs, and social enterprises as well as hybrid organizational forms
such as public-private partnerships, and contracting-out, make it too re-
strictive to equate the provision of public goods and services with provision
through government agencies.
There is a need therefore to shift the focus away from government versus
market provision and instead look at the wider incentives that providers face,
in order to generate insights into how public goods and services should be
provided. Studying this requires a better understanding of the frictions that
prevent an e¢ cient allocation of goods and services with signicant social
returns.
This review builds a framework to develop the main ideas in an emerging
literature that studies incentives in organizations with three core features: (i)
the good or service being produced has a signicant social component that
is not captured by its market value; (ii) outcomes and inputs are di¢ cult
to measure; and (iii) some of those whose e¤ort is needed are motivated
agents, i.e. care about the output that they produce.2
1See, for example, the World Develoment Report (2004) and Finan et al (2017).
2We depart from the standard models of agency in exploring non-pecuniary motivations
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Outside of economics, exploring the implications of pro-social motivation
would need scant justication. But there is a strong tradition of putting self-
interest at the core of economic models. However, as the quote from Adam
Smith at the beginning suggests, he was acutely aware of the importance of
wider forms of motivation. Our focus ts into a broader line of research that
models motivation beyond more standard selsh goals.3
The review develops an organizing framework for studying the link be-
tween motivation and incentives. It joins the theory of contracts and orga-
nizations with the focus in public economics focus on providing goods and
services with social benets e¢ ciently. The literature on contracts and orga-
nizations has been careful in delineating frictions that are due to imperfect
observability and contractibility and the attendant agency problems that
they create. But the focus has mainly been on production of outputs where
costs and benets of actions are reected in prots. Public economics has
studied the importance of public good elements such as non-excludability and
non-rivalry. However, it has traditionally spent little time on understanding
the contracting frictions which underpin the reason why there is a public
component in the rst place. That said, Coase (1960) pointed out long ago
that the problem of public goods provision is fundamentally grounded in the
di¢ culty of creating property rights for those who gain or lose, along with
problems of what in the language of modern contract theory would be called
measurability and contractibility.4
In our benchmark model, an organization is charged with the deliver-
of agents, but after taking these motivations into account, they are assumed to make
choices subject to constraints exactly as in standard economic models. As a result, the
standard features of rational choice theory will apply  for example, more choices will
not make an agent worse o¤. This distinguishes our approach from that of behavioral
economics.
3See, for example, Akerlof and Kranton, (2010), Benabou and Tirole, (2006), Besley
and Ghatak, (2005), Bowles, (1998, 2016), Kamenica, (2012), Murdock, (2003), and Sen
(1977).
4While our focus will be on applications where there are social benets that are external
to the organization, it can also be applied to cases where these benets are largely be
localized to the organization and are valued mostly by those who are associated with the
rm. For example, a commercial research laboratory, an elite school, a sports club, or an
artistic organization may all produce something that have some public good component,
but that is unlikely to be signicant. However, the stakeholders may care about the benets
over and above any pecuniary aspects of their involvement (e.g., employees, alumni, fans)
and the other two features may well apply - agency problems and presence of motivated
agents.
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ing a good or service with social costs or benets. It must design an in-
centive scheme for its workers whose e¤orts determine the quality of the
output. Workers may share the values of the organization, embodied in a
form of pro-social motivation. We extend the benchmark model to incorpo-
rate measurement di¢ culties in the quality of the output, the possibility of
multi-tasking considerations, and the selection of agents. We also explore
alternative forms of non-pecuniary motivation: commitment to a mission,
conforming to an identity, having reputational concerns, pursuing status and
being altruistic.
Although the approach is stylized, its logic is useful in a range of appli-
cations such as providing education, health-care, prisons or policing. In all
such cases, given the presence of social objectives such as equal access, or
externalities, the level of provision would fall short of socially desired levels
if it is left to the market. Organizations that are set up to provide such
services are populated by teachers, doctors, nurses, prison guards or police
whose professional ethics play a key role in shaping their behavior along with
a commitment to making the organization successful. Although direct public
provision plays a core role in these cases, some public services are also pro-
vided by NGOs and non-prot organizations and the ideas developed here
are applicable for these examples too. Even in standard private for-prot
rms, there are many aspects of business activity which have value not cap-
tured by prot; rms must choose how far they pollute the environment or
support disadvantaged communities. Harnessing pro-social motivation may
also be relevant here.5
Two robust messages emerge from the framework. First, non-selsh mo-
tivation and nancial incentives are most often substitutes, justifying the
limited use of monetary incentives in such contexts. Second, selection of
agents based on their pro-social motivation matters for e¢ cient provision;
having a workforce that is committed to a pro-social cause may have bene-
cial consequences. This suggests a greater need to focus on a wider denition
of human capital which includes commitment to pro-social goals.6
The wider policy context for this review is the perennial search by govern-
ments all over the world for more e¤ective ways of delivering public services.
Just how far standard payment-by-results is warranted has been at the cen-
5See Besley and Ghatak (2007, 2017a) and Hart and Zingales (2017) for topics such as
corporate social responsibility and social enterprise that are relevant in this context.
6Ashraf and Bandiera (2017a) formulate this around the idea of altruistic capital.
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tre of debates which began in the early 1990s spearheaded by works such as
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) that focused on reforming the public sector and
administrative services. The so-called New Public Managementwhich was
popular at the time suggested the possibility of an increased use of nancial
incentives. This led to a range of policy experiments many of which have
proven controversial in part because they were viewed as an a¤ront to the tra-
ditional ethos of the public sector where it is assumed that frontline workers
are pro-socially motivated.7 Finan et al (2017) provides an excellent review
of the state of knowledge in this area, particularly the set of papers based on
evidence from eld experiments on the use of incentives in the provision of
public services, mostly looking at evidence from developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next sec-
tion, we review some of the background ideas relating to motivation in the
context of public goods provision. Section 3 lays out a basic approach to
study motivation in a canonical principal-agent problem and considers some
extensions. Section 4 then looks at di¤erent models of motivation that can
be represented in the framework. Section 5 outlines some unresolved issues
and future directions for research.
2 Motivation and Public Service Provision
The broad idea of motivation in the context of public goods and services
relates to a wider literature on the nature of motivation in economics. Bowles
(2016) has emphasized the importance of pro-social motivation in a wide
variety of situations including in market contexts. He also emphasizes,
particularly in Bowles (1998), that pro-social preferences are endogenous
and depends on the socialization of citizens. Other commentators, such as
Sandel (2012), have emphasized how di¤erent means of allocating resources
e.g., making greater use of markets and nancial incentives can a¤ect the
kind of societal values that emerge.
Having motivated public servants at the core of public service delivery is
central to many sociological accounts of bureaucracy. BothWeber (1922) and
Durkheim (1956) saw commitment to public service as the sine qua non of
e¤ectively functioning bureaucracies which deliver services to their citizens.
The idea of mission motivation in public bureaucracies is also emphasized in
7See LeGrand (2003) for a discussion of these issues.
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Wilson (1989) and Tirole (1994). This contrasts with the standard economic
theory of bureaucracy based on self-interest as developed in Niskanen (1972).
There is no ample evidence of di¤erences in motivation between sectors
of the economy. Dur and Zoutenbier (2014, 2015) nd strong evidence for
greater altruism of workers that select into public sector occupations in cross-
country data and in the German Socio-Economic Panel. Barr et al (2011)
uses two proxies for intrinsic motivations based on a survey-based measure
of the health professionalsphilanthropic motivations as well as one based
on an experiment to measure pro-social motivations. They nd that both
proxies predict health professionalsdecision to work in the non-prot sector.
Gregg et al (2011) show that individuals who work in the non-prot sector
undertake more unpaid overtime than those who are employed in for-prot
rms, giving evidence of stronger motivation to work for non-prot goals by
some workers.
Our core formulation of pro-social motivation is essentially identical to
the idea of warm-glowin the literature on charitable donations (see, for ex-
ample, the discussion in Andreoni, 2006). This is distinct from the standard
model of altruism in economics because the utility that individuals receive is
intrinsically linked to a persons involvement in a pro-social activity. With
warm glow an individual cares about their own donation over and above the
public goods that it funds. In our framework a worker cares about her con-
tribution to a rm intrinsically over and above the output that it produces.
Pro-social motivation as conceived of here can be thought of as a part
of the professionalization of public bureaucracies and public service deliv-
ery. Part of this is formulating a code of contact that is internalized in
the preferences of workers. There are examples where the codes are written
explicitly.
The Law Society of England and Wales species the following code of
conduct for its members as follows:8
Ethics involves making a commitment to acting with integrity and
honesty in accordance with widely recognized moral principles.
Ethics will guide a professional towards an appropriate way to
behave in relation to moral dilemmas that arise in practice.
Ethics is based on the principles of serving the interests of con-
sumers of legal services and of acting in the interests of the ad-
8See http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/ethics/
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ministration of justice, in which, in the event of a conict, acting
in the interests of the administration of justice prevails.
All of these are explicit exhortations to put values above self-interest.
The medical profession is also explicit about the values that profession-
als should adhere to. Perhaps the most famous statement of this is the
Hippocratic Oath9 which states, among other things, that:
I will apply, for the benet of the sick, all measures which are
required, avoiding those twin traps of over-treatment and ther-
apeutic nihilism...I will remember that I remain a member of
society, with special obligations to all my fellow human beings,
those sound of mind and body as well as the inrm...If I do not
violate this oath, may I enjoy life and art, respected while I live
and remembered with a¤ection thereafter. May I always act so
as to preserve the nest traditions of my calling and may I long
experience the joy of healing those who seek my help.
The reference to the joy of healingin this quote is closely aligned with the
idea of warm glow in agent motivation.
Our concept of agent motivation in public service contexts mirrors the
idea of a public service ethos. Survey-based approaches, such as Perry
(1996), have developed structured questionnaire for measuring this using six
categories that try to elicit attitudes intended to measure having an outlook
on life which is indicative of greater public service orientation: attraction
to policy making; commitment to the public interest; social justice; civic
duty; compassion; and self-sacrice. These can be used to construct an
overall measure of the strength of public service motivation. Moynihan
and Pandey (2007) show that are strong correlations between organizational
form and the kinds of measures of motivation that form the basis of these
Perry Scores. Dal Bo et al (2013) use these measures in their study of the
selection of bureaucrats in Mexico as part of a recruitment drive where they
study whether higher wages led to selection of more able and/or motivated
workers.
The notion of a mission-oriented organization sta¤ed by motivated agents
corresponds well to many accounts of employees in non-prot organizations.
Weisbrod (1988) observes that
9This version was written in 1964 by Louis Lasagna, Academic Dean of the School of
Medicine at Tufts University, and is used in many medical schools today.
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Non-prot organizations may act di¤erently from private
rms not only because of the constraint on distributing prot but
also, perhaps, because the motivations and goals of managers and
directors ... di¤er. If some non-prots attract managers whose
goals are di¤erent from those managers in the proprietary sector,
the two types of organizations will behave di¤erently.(page 31).
He also observes that
Managers will ... sort themselves, each gravitating to the
types of organizations that he or she nds least restrictive most
compatible with his or her personal preferences(page 32)
He goes on to cite evidence to support the idea that such sorting is important
in practice in the non-prot sector. For example, Ballou andWeisbrod (2002)
state that (w)hile the compensating di¤erentials may explain why levels
of compensation di¤er across organizational forms, it does not explain the
di¤erentials in the use of strong relative to weak incentives.
3 Motivation and Incentives
This section develops a stylized model of motivation and incentives with three
features. First, the service being produced generates a non-pecuniary social
benet that is not reected in the prot of the organization. This captures a
classical externality such as environmental protection, prevention of commu-
nicable disease, social benets from primary education or policing. It could
also be motivated by a goal of minimum provision in basic healthcare, edu-
cation or housing. Second, these benets are measured imperfectly limiting
their use incentive contracts. Third, the employees are willing to commit
more e¤ort for freein a pro-social cause.
3.1 Benchmark Model
The precise formulation developed here is based on the model in Besley
and Ghatak (2005). However, there are several closely-related formula-
tions including Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), Francois (2000, 2007), Francois
and Vlassopoulos (2008), Hagen (2006) and Prendergast (2003, 2007, 2008)
which develop the idea of the importance of non-pecuniary motivation in
organizations, particularly those that provide public services.
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3.1.1 Projects
Consider an organization with a single employee (the agent) who is entrusted
with carrying out a task with a binary outcome, y 2 f0; 1g where y =
1 denotes success and y = 0 denotes failure. The agents e¤ort is
normalized to be the probability of success and is denoted by e 2 [0; 1]. The
disutility of e¤ort is e2=2; i.e., it is quadratic in e¤ort.
Success yields a nancial return  and a social return S. The latter is
the sum of returns to a community of N beneciaries, i.e.
S =
NX
i=1
si.
Thus the total payo¤ V is:
V =

S +  if y = 1
0 if y = 0.
We assume V > 0. In many applications,  = 0 (e.g., provision of some
basic services like primary health or primary education where revenues are
set only to cover cost) so that there are no prots associated with success
and failure.10
Example 1: In a health care application the agent might be a doctor or
a nurse whose actions a¤ect the well-being of patients including those
who may not be able to a¤ord treatment.
Example 2: In an application to the justice system, the agents might be
legal professionals such as judges or lawyers, who care about fairness
of the outcome.
Key decisions are made by a principal who acts as a trusteeon behalf of
the beneciaries. She has access to nancial resources, e.g., from taxation,
a nancial endowment, or donations. Her objective function is
W = e V   C
where C is the nancial cost of provision. The only element of costs that we
focus on are wage payments with all other costs normalized at zero.
10In some applications, it may even be reasonable to suppose that  < 0, i.e., the
organization makes negative prots funded by an endowment or other source of funds.
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This formulation implies payments to agents are viewed as costs. Thus,
even if providers get some utility due to their pro-social motivation, the
principal does not value this directly. Thus, the approach that we are using
is similar to the study of political agency problems where the view taken is
that any rents that politicians get from delivering policies on behalf of voters
are not welfare-relevant with the focus being exclusively on the welfare of
voters.11 The parallel to this idea in our setting is that we care only about
the benets that running public services delivers for their beneciaries (who
may also be tax payers or pay a service-fee) but not the utility that providers
receive. Thus, even if doctors do experience a joy of healingwe do not
allow such payo¤s to be used in deciding how to run the health system.
3.1.2 Agents
The payo¤ of the agent, who bears the disutility of e¤ort, is
w + e (b+ )  e
2
2
where w is a at component of her pay, b is an output-contingent aspect of
her pay, and we refer to  as motivation - the non-pecuniary payo¤ the agent
gets when the task generates a successful outcome. Having  > 0, is the
essence of agent motivation in this setting. Crucially, we attach motivation
not just to working an organization but to good performance.12
We allow  to vary in the population with I potential types, indexed by i,
where
I  I 1::::  1 = 0:
Thus, a higher index i corresponds to greater non-pecuniary motivation. Let
i be the fraction of agents in the population of type i. Below we will mostly
use a two-type set up with  2 f0; g where  > 0, a fraction  of agents being
motivated, and the remaining fraction (1 ) are unmotivated or selsh. We
will focus on the case where I  V , i.e. even the most motivated agent
does not fully internalize the value of the marginal social surplus.
We interpret i as warm glow motivation rather than conventional altru-
ism. It is the fact that the warm glow is aligned with e¤ort that produces a
11See Besley (2006) for a discussion of such models.
12Our results are not signicantly a¤ected if in addition to this, there was a at (not
outcome-contingent) component of motivation, relating to the rewards of entering certain
occupations.
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higher payo¤ for the beneciaries which makes this pro-social motivation. A
conventional model of altruism would associate i with the gains from ben-
eciaries as embodied in S. Section 4.6 discusses the implications of this
formulation.
We will focus initially on the case where i is observable, thus setting
aside issues of self-selection by workers in particular occupations. This is
issue is discussed in section 3.2.3 below.
3.1.3 Full Information
Consider rst an environment in which the principal can write a contract
with the agent that species the level of e¤ort. In this case e¤ort will be set
to maximize the payo¤ of the principal who is assumed to act on behalf of
the beneciaries:
e = arg max
e

e V   e
2
2

= V:
Since e is a probability, we normalize so that V < 1. This is the rst-best
level of e¤ort and serves as a benchmark. Achieving this e¤ort level need
not depend on being able to contract directly over e¤ort. If the outcome can
be measured then it su¢ ces to o¤er the agent a reward of V    to get the
optimal e¤ort level. Parallel to the concept of a residual claimantin the
context of nancial prots, we call this making the agent a social residual
claimant since in such cases, she captures the full marginal social benet
from her e¤ort.
We need to be sure that any arrangement respects the participation con-
straint of the agent. To explore this formally, suppose that the outside
option is worth u. To satisfy this, the principal has the option to o¤er a
payment of w (which can, in principle, be negative). Then the agents payo¤
at e will be:
e V   e
2
2
+ w =
V 2
2
+ w:
Now w can be adjusted to ensure that V
2
2
+ w = u: If u is very low then
we would need to set w < 0, to make the participation constraint bind.
In this case, the agent pays a franchise fee to the principal to work in
the organization which increases the beneciaries payo¤s. This is like a
case where an NGO provides a government service and uses donations or its
endowments to pay some of the cost. The payo¤ to the principal who acts
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on behalf of the beneciaries is then
eV   w = V 2   w = V
2
2
  u:
Setting w < 0 to reduce the agent to u may not be an option if the agent has
limited wealth.13 In this case, the agent will earn a rent. Such rents are not
desirable given that the principal wishes to provide the service as least cost.
This is the most natural case in most applications and so from now onwards
we focus on the cases where the agent has no wealth.
Our focus on warm-glow pro-social motivation does a¤ect the partici-
pation constraint of the agent compared to a case of pure altruism. This
is because the agent gets her warm glow utility only if she is employed to
provide the service. However, a pure altruist would value the project even
if another agent is employed to deliver it thus a¤ecting her perception of
the outside option. We will examine the implications of this formulation in
section 4.6.
3.1.4 Information Frictions
We now explore the case where e¤ort cannot be observed and hence specied
as part of the contract. This is the case studied in classical principal-agent
problems. The principal now o¤ers a compensation package to an agent
whose motivation is  that consists of two parts - a bonus, b, that is paid
only when y = 1, and a xed wage component, w.
The principal now solves the following problem:
max
fb;wg
( V   b) e  w (1)
subject to:
(i) the incentive constraint which stipulates that the e¤ort level maximizes
the agents private payo¤ given (b; w):
e = arg max
e2[0;1]

e [b+ ] + w   e
2
2

= b+ :
(ii) the participation constraint of the agent that requires the agents
expected payo¤ is at least as high as his outside option:
e (b+ ) + w   e
2
2
 u: (2)
13Capital markets would not help as lending money to agents to buy such franchises
would then lead to an agency problem between the agent and the lender.
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To these we need to add a limited liability constraint to rule out the
case where the principal franchises the project to her (as described above),
thereby achieving the full-information outcome. Hence we assume that, in
any state of the world, the agents income cannot be below a certain level w,
where w  0. Formally this is:
(iii) a limited liability constraint requiring that the agent be left with at
least w:
b+ w  w;w  w: (3)
For simplicity, we set w = w = 0 in what follows. This reects the as-
sumption of limited wealth that we mentioned before, and the fact that
non-pecuniary penalties are ruled out.
In choosing the level of nancial incentives, the principal faces a trade-
o¤ between providing incentives to the agent (setting b higher) and keeping
costs of provision low. The outside option of the agent plays an important
role in determining b. As is standard in these models, the xed wage will be
set at as low a level as possible (which happens to be w = 0) since a higher
wage has no e¤ect on e¤ort and so if the principal wants to reward the agent
more, it is better to raise the bonus b.
There are two cases that can arise depending on whether the participation
constraint is binding.
Suppose rst that the participation constraint is not binding. Recognizing
that e = b+ , the principal will choose the bonus to solve
max
b
( V   b) (b+ ) :
This yields b = V 
2
and an e¤ort level of V+
2
. So the principal sets incentive
pay equal to half the di¤erence in the societal valuation and the agents
valuation of success. E¤ort increases with  but not one-for-one as the
principal will adjust incentives in part to o¤set the e¤ect of greater pro-
social motivation. Since the agent is motivated, there is less need for a
nancial incentive.
The expected payo¤ of the principal in this case is ( V   b) e =  V+
2
2
while that of the agent is e (b+ )   e2
2
= (V+)
2
8
: This will be the contract
o¤ered by the principal as long as the participation constraint of the agent
is not binding, i.e.
1
8
(V + )2  u: (4)
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which depends on V and  being high enough relative to the outside option u.
Therefore, when the reservation payo¤ is low and the participation constraint
does not bind, the agent earns an on-the-job rent which is increasing in .
If (4) does not hold the participation constraint is not satised when then
b = V 
2
and we have solve for b directly from the participation constraint, i.e.
1
2
(b+ )2 = u: The optimal incentive pay, in this case, is set by the outside
option but with a discount to reect the agents motivation. Putting this
together yields the following expression for the optimal nancial incentive for
providing the service:
b =

V 
2
u  1
8
(V + )2p
2u   otherwise.
Whether or not the participation constraint binds, nancial incentives and
motivation are substitutes, i.e. a higher value of  corresponds to lower b.
The corresponding e¤ort level is given by:
e =

V+
2
u  1
8
(V + )2p
2u otherwise.
We saw that e¤ort is increasing in  when the participation constraint
is not binding. However, when constraint is binding, then the e¤ort put
in by the agent is independent of ; there is an one-for-one crowding out of
incentives as the agent becomes more motivated. However, agent motivation
is still benecial as it reduces the cost of employing the agent.
The expected payo¤ of the agent in this case is maxf1
8
(V + )2 ; ug while
the expected payo¤ to the principal is:
W () =
(
[ V+]2
4
u  1
8
(V + )2p
2u

V +   p2u otherwise. (5)
This is increasing in  as is expected from the discussion above.
We now draw out four implications of the basic model.
First, the framework underpins the importance of pro-social motivation,
such as the notion of public service ethoswhich we discussed above. Even
when the participation constraint binds, there is a benet from hiring a
motivated agent is that e¤ort can be elicited at lower cost. Equation (5)
shows that the expected social payo¤ is increasing in  whether or not the
14
participation constraint binds. Having a more motivated agent is always
better for the beneciaries as it lowers cost of provision.14
Second, the model says that selection on motivation matters and a¤ects
the contracts that agents receive. Since  is observable, the principal can
tailor the bonus to the type of agent who has been hired. More motivated
agents receive a lower bonus payment and yet produce higher e¤ort. So
the public service ethos is valuable to the e¢ ciency of provision. This does,
however, raise the issue of self-selection when  is unobserved which we will
explore further in section 3.2.3.
Third, all else equal, motivated agents are more likely to earn an on-the-
job rent. Unless the participation constraint binds more motivated agents
earn greater on-the-job rents than less motivated agents. This rent comes
from directly valuing the work that they do. Thus we would expected
motivated agents to report higher levels of job-satisfaction. This is indeed
consistent with a large empirical literature.15
Fourth, as in standard principal-agent models monetary incentives still
elicit more e¤ort. Hence the model does not result in monetary incentives
crowding out e¤ort. A useful way of thinking about the di¤erence between
a standard model of material motivation and the one with pro-social agent
motivation is as follows. Since e = b+ , the elasticity of e¤ort with respect
to rewards is lower for more motivated agents. Hence, less incremental e¤ort
is created for each successive increment of nancial rewards.16 To see this
formally, note that from the incentive-constraint e = b+  so that:
@ log e
@ log b
=
b
b+ 
;
which is decreasing in . Although the model does not display crowd-
out of e¤ort with incentives, there is a cross-sectional implication which
looks similar to this. Suppose that there are di¤erent organizations with
agents having di¤erent levels of . Then those with higher  will have lower
incentives and higher e¤ort. Hence higher incentives will be associated with
lower e¤ort even though the relationship is not causal.
14There is a large literature on the di¤erence between public and private sector wages
which bears directly on this. In general, there is heterogeneity across groups of workers
and countries see, for example, Postel-Vinay (2015) for discussion.
15See, for example, Ritz et al (2016) for a recent review.
16Prendergast (1999) emphasises how the provision of incentives in rms depends on
the size of this elasticity.
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3.2 Extensions
In this section we consider three extensions to the benchmark model of incen-
tives with motivated agents that are relevant in organizations whose output
generates social returns.
3.2.1 Poor Measurement
While measuring output is an issue in all sectors, these di¢ culties are par-
ticularly acute in public service provision; there are well-known di¢ culties
of doing this reliably in health systems (see, for example, Propper and Wil-
son, 2012) and in education (Woessman, 2016). The framework that we are
using can encompass these considerations incorporating insights from those
who have explored measurement problems in principal-agent problems such
as Baker (1992).
To explore this, suppose that  = 0, so that there is no signal of success
or failure coming from nancial ows. We also continue to set w = w = 0.
Suppose then that, rather than observing y or V directly, the principal
receives a signal of whether there is success or failure which we denote by
 2 f0; 1g where
Prob f = 1 : y = 1g =  = Prob f = 0 : y = 0g  1=2.
It is possible to observe failure when there is success and vice versa and a
higher value of  denotes a better signal: there is perfect measurability when
 = 1 and when  = 1=2, the signal is completely uninformative about
whether there is success and hence not usable to incentivize the agent.
Rewards to the agent can only be made to depend on  and not on y:
The agents expected payo¤ is now
[e  + fe+ (1  e) (1  )g b]  1
2
e2:
The incentive constraint is:
e =  + (2  1) b:
Thus, e¤ort is increasing in the quality of the signal, , for any given level
of the nancial incentive. However, for  < 1, nancial rewards elicit less
e¤ort. This will make using such rewards less attractive and if  = 1=2,
nancial incentives serve no purpose at all.
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The principals expected payo¤ is now:
[eV   fe+ (1  e) (1  )g b] .
Substituting e from the incentive-constraint, and focusing on the case where
the participation constraint does not bind, the principal chooses b to solve:
max
b
[f + (2  1) bg fV   b (2  1)g   (1  ) b] :
This yields the following rst-order condition for the choice of b for an agent
with motivation :
b = max

1
2 (2  1)

V      1  
2  1

; 0

:
This immediately implies that measurement problems deter the use of nan-
cial rewards. The threshold for incentive pay is now V > + 1 
2 1 compared
to V >  when measurement is perfect. Even if  = 0 it may be optimal not
use nancial incentives.
Thus, this extension of the basic model explains precisely the logic of why
poorer measurement of output in the provision of public services can also
explain why nancial incentives are used relatively rarely in such instances.
This dovetails well with some of the ongoing policy discussions about using
pay-for-performance in pubic services. A good example is the case of teacher
incentives where there are doubts about whether having a testing regime for
pupils is a su¢ ciently accurate basis for introducing performance-related pay.
However, it is possible that deciding to introduce bonus pay is accompanied
by attempts to improve the measurability of outcomes through new systems
of performance management (increasing ). In this sense measurement of
output and bonus pay can be complements.
This discussion of measurement issues reinforces more strongly why soci-
eties rely so heavily on pro-social motivation rather than incentives. If b = 0,
then e =  and the only way to elicit e¤ort is through employing agents in
providing the service who are motivated by the concerns about the bene-
ciaries. This further underlines why appealing to a public service ethos and
professional ethics is deemed so important in promoting the e¤ective provi-
sion of public services. It formally illustrates the rationale for the idealized
notion of a Weberian bureaucracy sta¤ed by motivated agents.
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3.2.2 Multi-tasking
Multi-tasking is another frequently-cited reason for economizing on incentive
pay in public services. As we shall see, it is also linked to measurement of
outputs. Public service occupations rarely involve one-dimensional tasks.
For example, school teachers are not just responsible for making sure that
students do well in tests, but also for fostering a spirit of curiosity and in-
stilling desirable social values. Considerations of multi-tasking are therefore
often quite relevant in incentive design. Here too, there is no qualitative dif-
ference between public service provision, and the market economy. However,
without prices to reect the importance of tasks to the organization, it is dif-
cult to create appropriate performance measures of the relevant outcomes
based on prot incentives.
All work on multi-tasking owes a debt to the classic paper of Holmström
and Milgrom (1991) who showed that using incentive pay based on the out-
put of one task may induce the agent to substitute away e¤ort from other
tasks where output is harder to measure, which may be detrimental to the
principals interest. They argued that incentive pay is less likely to be used
even if measurement of outputs associated with some tasks are well-measured
because of inter-dependence between the tasks. Dixit (2002) emphasizes the
importance of multi-tasking in public service settings and how these reduce
high-powered nancial incentives.17 Here, we bring these insights to bear by
extending the core framework above to incorporate these ideas maintaining
a focus on the importance of pro-social motivation in incentive design.
In the benchmark model, more e¤ort made both  and S more likely and
so there was no trade-o¤ between nancial and social objectives. A multi-
tasking model gives a canonical way to study such a trade-o¤. For example,
if a school reward teachers only on the test scores of their students, they are
likely to cut down the e¤orts aimed at imparting skills such as curiosity and
civic values that are hard to measure but important nevertheless. Overall the
outcome may end up being less desirable than if they are paid a at wage.
To see this more formally, suppose there are two tasks whose output
measures are y1 2 f0; 1g and y2 2 f0; 1g. The agent has to put in two
types of e¤ort in these two tasks, e1 and e2, and the cost of e¤ort for each
task is 1
2
(e21 + e1e2) and
1
2
(e22 + e1e2), where we assume that 1 >  > 0.
This assumption implies that the tasks are substitutes since committing more
e¤ort to one task increases the marginal cost of e¤ort committed to the other
17He also considers the importance of multiple principals in this context.
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one.
We suppose that the principal values success in both tasks taking into
account both nancial and social payo¤s. The marginal benets from higher
e¤ort in each task will be denoted by V1 and V2 for task 1 and task 2 respec-
tively. The agent too derives is motivated in relation to both tasks receiving
a non-pecuniary benet from success in each task, denoted by 1 and 2. Al-
though there is an element of pro-social motivation, this may not be perfectly
aligned with goals being pursued by the principal in terms of the absolute
and relative importance assigned to each task.
The principal can now reward each task di¤erent with a nancial incentive
for success in each task being denoted by b1 and b2. We focus on the case there
the participation constraint does not bind and also where w = w = 0. As in
the previous section, we allow the outcome to be mis-measured. However,
we focus on this only in relation to one task: for task 2 there is a signal
 2 f0; 1g such that
Prob f = 1 : y2 = 1g =  = Prob f = 0 : y2 = 0g  1=2.
Output in task 1 is assumed to be measurable perfectly. Although this is an
extreme case, it will serve to illustrate somewhat precisely why having e¤ort
on both tasks as substitutes and only one task being subject to measurement
problems a¤ects the way that incentives are crafted for both tasks, lowering
the using of bonuses across the board.
The agent will now maximize
(b1 + 1) e1 + b2fe2 + (1  )(1  e2)g+ 2e2   1
2
e21  
1
2
e22   e1e2
by choosing e1 and e2. This yields the following rst order conditions:
b1 + 1 = e1 + e2 (6)
b2(2  1) + 2 = e1 + e2:
The principals problem is now to choose b1 and b2 to maximize:
(V1   b1)e1 + V2e2   fe2 + (1  ) (1  e2)g b2:
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subject to (6)18 Solving this yields:
b1 =
1
2

(V1   1)   (1  )
2  1

b2 =
1
2 (2  1)

(V2   2)  (1  )
2  1

assuming an interior solution.19
This multi-tasking model generates a number of additional insights on the
design of incentives with motivated agents. If there is no substitutability
in the tasks, i.e.  = 0, then there is no interdependence in the way that
they are incentivized and the factors that we have discussed above, agent
motivation and measurement apply to each task separately. The tasks are
also separated if  = 1, i.e. there is no measurement error in either task.
Hence, any new features are due to  > 0 and  < 1. Now we nd that
measurement error in task two spills overto task one, attening incentives
across the board. This is a standard result in multi-tasking models. Here,
it highlights how having poor performance measurement can contribute to
overall at incentives of the kind that are often seen for tasks in organizations
with pro-social missions. As ! 1=2; it is not optimal to incentivize either
task. Then the organization will rely exclusively on agent motivation in
both tasks.20
3.2.3 Selection and Incentives
We now turn to selection and incentives. This is a natural concern in environ-
ments which reply on employing agents who care about the outcome directly.
18Simultaneously solving for e1 and e2, we can obtain the following expressions for e¤ort
as a function of motivation levels and bonuses of:
e1 =
b1   (2  1)b2
1  2 +
1   2
1  2
e2 =
(2  1)b2   b1
1  2 +
2   1
1  2 :
19A corner solution at zero is possible and will prevail as ! 1=2.
20For the measurement to spillover across tasks, requires that the tasks cannot be un-
bundled, i.e. performed by di¤erent agents. Thus, this result applies only when there is
genuine joint production.
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But the assumption made so far, that , is observable, is too strong. Prin-
cipals will wish to recruit the most motivated agents to perform a task and
many public organizations have elaborate recruitment processes for selecting
people with high pro-social credentials for key public service roles. Here we
briey discuss the possibility of designing di¤erent remuneration packages to
achieve self-selection.21 As we shall see, the main issue in the current model
is to get the motivated agents to di¤erentiate themselves from selsh agents
since the latter will tend to receive higher bonus pay. Intuitively, this imply
reducing incentives paid to all types of workers. We will explore to what
extent this logic is correct in our framework. As well as choosing di¤erent
bonus levels, it will also be possible to use di¤erent levels of the xed wage.
We now revert to the benchmark model with measurement problems or
multi-tasking elements. To x ideas we consider only two types of agents:
motivated ( = ) and unmotivated ( = 0) and we use the subscripts M
and Uto label them. We also focus on the case where the participation
constraint does not bind for the motivated agent. Using the logic above,
if  is observable, she will receive a bonus bM = V 2 and puts in a higher
level of e¤ort eM = V+2 . The unmotivated agent will receive bU =
V
2
and
commit e¤ort eU = V2 . What creates a self-selection dilemma is the fact
that motivated agents are treated less well as than unmotivated agents, i.e.
receiving lower pay.
To explore the case where agentstypes are private information, note that
the expected payo¤ of the motivated agent from the remuneration package
above is u^
 


=
(V+)
2
8
which we have assumed exceeds u. For an unmoti-
vated agent, the expected payo¤ is u^ (0) = (V )
8
2
< u^
 


. But will this induce
agents to reveal their type truthfully?
If a motivated agent masquerades as an unmotivated agent and chooses
the contract b = V
2
then the e¤ort level will now be e0M =
V
2
+ which exceeds
eM . And her expected payo¤ is 12
 
V
2
+ 
2
which exceeds u^
 


. So, as we
anticipated, she is better o¤ with the contract intended for a unmotivated
type. The reverse is true for an unmotivated agent. Thus all agents will
pick the unmotivated agents contract and the motivated agent will get an
even higher rent. There are two possible solutions to this: to o¤er only a
single contract (a pooling contract) or to adjust the contracts to achieve
21See Delfgaauw and Dur (2007, 2008, 2010), and Prendergast (1999).
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self-selection. Here we focus on the former.22
If the outside option, u is relatively low, then both kinds of agents earn
a rent as long u^ (0) > u. Now both wish to work for the organization. The
principal will now o¤er b = V 
2
or b = V
2
as the single contract depending
on whether motivated or unmotivated agents are more abundant. However,
if u^ (0) < u then only the motivated workers will join the organization with
a bonus of V 
2
. In this case, de facto the screening problem is solved
by having a su¢ ciently attractive outside option.23 If u > u^
 


, then the
organization will have to o¤er an expected utility of u to both types of agents.
Now the participation constraint will bind for both types. Following the
logic of the basic model, we will have bM =
p
2u    while bU =
p
2u, and
eM =
p
2u = eU . The self-selection problem for the motivated types now
reappears. However, if the only contract put on the table has bM =
p
2u ),
the screening problem is solved since unmotivated agents will prefer to work
elsewhere.24
This illustrates how the screening problem depends on the strength of
the outside option. When that is low and both motivated and unmotivated
agents will join the organization. As u goes up, the screening problem be-
comes easy to solve. The expected quality of public service provision will
therefore be higher as u goes up, through better selection on motivation.
This is consistent with the empirical evidence in Finan et al, (2017) who
show that despite the wage premium of public sector employees being higher
in low-income countries than in high-income countries, the quality of provi-
sion is signicantly lower.
There are many aspects of selection that could be explore. For example,
Aldashev et al (2018) develop a model of self-selection where motivational
self-selection into the non-prot sectors may be altered by the level of do-
nations received by non-prot rms leading to more selsh workers being
induced to work in that sector. Our framework has only a one-dimension
22See Delfgaauw and Dur (2008, 2010) for an exploration of separating contracts.
23See Ghatak, Morelli, and Sjöström (2007) about how the outside option a¤ects the
screening problem, and how in turn that may a¤ect the outside option.
24If in addition to the non-pecuniary payo¤s a motivated agent receives when output is
high, she also receives a at non-pecuniary motivation " by working in the organization
(where " can be small), then that helps to solve the self-selection problem in the case where
the participation constraint binds. The principal can then o¤er a contract that gives an
expected payo¤ of u  " to the M -type agent which will not yield an expected payo¤ of
u to the U -type agent.
22
di¤erence between agents. However, it is also interesting to contemplate
di¤erences in both ability and motivation as has been studied by Delfgaauw
and Dur (2010). In such contexts, there is a concern that low wages or in-
centive pay may appeal to low ability agents as well as those with greater
pro-social motivation. Dal Bo et al (2013) and Ashraf et al (2018) provide
empirical evidence suggesting higher wages or incentive pay actually selects
agents that have both higher ability and are more motivated. This rein-
forces the importance of giving a prominent role to the study of selection in
understanding organizations with wider missions than pure prot.
Our discussion of selection assumes that the alternative to having moti-
vated agents is selsh workers who care only about money. Auriol and Brilon
(2014) add an interesting additional dimension by supposing that there can
be malignworkers who get warm glow from destructive behavior.25 The
mission-oriented sector then has to monitoring to deter such bad workers
from working there. In the equilibrium of their model, bad workers work
in the prot-oriented sector, which uses monitoring and bonus payments for
good behavior increase to control the damage that such workers do.
4 Models of Pro-Social Motivation
The core set-up puts into sharp relief the role of motivation and how it
interacts with the use of pecuniary incentives, in shaping organizational ef-
fectiveness. In this section, we focus now more on the microfoundations or
narratives concerning where the non-pecuniary motivation comes from.
We begin by discussing the idea that motivation comes from agents having
strong views about how the provision of relevant good or service is organized
(mission preferences). We then discuss the idea of pro-social motivation
related to the sociological concept of identity. Next, we explore pro-social
motivation as a form of intrinsic motivation. We then consider a foundation
based on signaling and reputation. After that, we consider the link between
motivation and rewards for status. Finally, we look at the possibility that
motivation comes from a case of pure altruism where the agent attaches a
weight to the social surplus of the beneciaries. We illustrate all of these
possibilities in the core model developed above.
25They use the example of paedoles entering the child care sector. In our framework
this would be an issue when  is even higher for this type of worker compared to good
motivated workers.
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4.1 Mission Motivation
To introduce the idea of mission motivation, suppose that there is a variety
of projects that can be undertaken denoted by k = 1; ::; K. Associated with
each project choice will be a payo¤ to the community of beneciaries Vk and
a payo¤ to the i-th motivated agent, ik  0 . The idea of missions is like a
form of product di¤erentiation in which public services can be provided in a
plethora of di¤erent ways, following an approach introduced in Besley and
Ghatak (2005). There are many real-world examples which capture the idea
of heterogeneous missions such as di¤erences in views about the nature or
priorities in health systems, the kinds of curricula that should be pursued in
schools, and what kinds of crime should be the priority of criminal justice
and law enforcement systems.
A natural benchmark case would be to suppose that it is the interests of
beneciaries which should take priority over the interests of providers (the
agent in out model) when choosing a mission. This naive view would assume
that optimal service provision should be governed by choosing k such that:
k 2 arg max
k
fVkg .
However, this ignores the fact that motivation of providers can matter to the
e¢ ciency of service provision since, if providers are highly motivated (ik is
large) for some particular mission, then a project can be undertaken at lower
costs that may be well worth funding. More broadly, this highlights the
role of diversity of providers in terms of causesthey are motivated by and
having a decentralized approach whereby providers are matched with projects
such that their preferences are well-aligned with the mission of the project,
as opposed to a top-down centralized approach of public good provision.
To illustrate the ideas further, we focus again on the case where the
participation constraint is not binding. Consider a mission k and a motivated
agent with preferences ik. Then the benet of the beneciaries net of the
cost of provision is:
W k (ik) =
(Vk + ik)
2
4
and the optimal mission when employing agent i is therefore
~k (i) 2 arg max
k

W k (ik)
	
:
One striking implication of this is, the interests of the provider should
optimally be taken into account even if she is not directly relevant to the
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social objective. This is because whether or not the provider likes the mission
will a¤ect the cost of employing him/her. This provides a microfoundation
for a commonly used way of modeling the objective function of non-prots.
For example, Newhouse (1970) models the objective function of non-prot
hospitals as depending in part on what physicians want.
We can also endogenize the selection of agents along with missions so
that providers are matched to beneciary priorities. Hence the principal
now chooses an fk; ig combination that are well-aligned or matched in the
sense that the most appropriate agent is chosen to deliver the particular
mission that is chosen, i.e.,n
~k;~{
o
2 arg max
fk;ig

W k (ik)
	
:
This model opens up the possibility of heterogeneous missions simultane-
ously being pursued by di¤erent providers. This is reminiscent of a Tiebout-
style model of local public goods provision where there are competing services
provided to cater for di¤erent tastes of providers.26
One simple way to illustrate this is for K = 2 and two types of agents,
I = 2. Suppose that
ik =

 if i = k
0 otherwise.
Hence agents are only motivated if they are working with their preferred
mission. We assume that V1 = V2 so that beneciaries do not care about
the mission. Suppose providers of type 1 like mission 1, while providers of
type 2 like mission 2:
Now sorting in heterogeneous public organizations reecting the di¤erent
kinds of pro-social motivation of providers can increase the expected payo¤
of the community. To see this formally, note that
W =
(
[ V+]
2
4
if i = k
V 2
2
otherwise.
In particular, e¤ort in a matched organization is e = V+
2
, while it is
e = V
2
in a mismatched organization. Besley and Ghatak (2005) formalizes
how competition among organizations providing the public good for providers
26See, for example, Wooders (1999).
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with di¤erent mission preferences will lead to perfect sorting and produce the
most e¢ cient outcome.
Our framework also underlines the value of diversity in the non-prot
sector provided that there is a variety of views on the way in which collec-
tive goods should be produced (as represented by the mission preferences).
Weisbrod (1988) emphasizes this role of non-prot organizations in achieving
diversity in public goods provision. For example, he observes that non-prots
will likely play a more important role in situations where there is greater un-
derlying diversity in preferences for collective goods in the population. For
example, he contrasts the U.S. and Japan suggesting that greater cultural
heterogeneity is partly responsible for the greater importance of non-prot ac-
tivity in the U.S. Our analysis of the role of competition in sorting principals
and agents on mission preferences underpins the role of diversity in achieving
e¢ ciency. As argued by Besley and Ghatak (2005), better matched orga-
nizations can result in higher e¤ort and output. Hence, diversity may not
only be good for the standard reason, namely, beneciaries get more choice,
but also in enhancing productive e¢ ciency.
Our model supposes that the principals who run rms act in the interest
of beneciaries. However, just as there are di¤erently motivated agents, there
can be principals with di¤erent perspectives. Then instead of the principal
being motivated by V , she may have a preference associated with success
that reects a warm-glow from success. This case is particularly relevant,
for example, if di¤erent potential suppliers can compete to provide a service
and the principal is also a donor who provides funding for a service.27 Then
any principal with personal wealth can set up an organization to provide
a public service. If governments care about beneciaries, then they can
choose to whom they wish to give grants and other kinds of inducements to
encourage selection of particular kinds of principals.
4.2 Identity and Motivation
Another way to interpret i is as a reection of a social identity adopted by
a worker when she works in a public-sector organization. Moreover, instead
of being xed and exogenous, as we have assumed so far, it may be governed
by actions undertaken by organizations and/or agents. The key insight of
27Scharf (2014) explores warm-glow motives by competing suppliers and shows how this
can lead to ine¢ cient selection of non-prots.
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Akerlof and Kranton (2005, 2010) in their work on the economics of identity is
behavior that economists normally think of as governed by exogenously given
preferences and standard trade-o¤s, such as between labor and leisure, often
depend on the self-image of individuals, and their connection with others in
a given social context.
Sociological theories have emphasized the social context-dependent na-
ture of behavior. People use social categories to describe di¤erent roles
and the notion of identity describes a persons self-image which depends on
how they conform with or depart from the norms for particular social cate-
gories in particular situations. For example, a teacher or a doctor, in dealing
with a student or a patient may be governed by some socially governed
norms of goodbehavior and departures from it may be costly, even though
standard economic models (such as the classical principal-agent framework)
would dictate that they simply take the most self-interestedaction.
Identity then corresponds to the self-classication of an individual as well
as that of others. In everyday life, such identities include family, gender,
race, culture, language, and ethnicity. However, they also a¤ect how people
self-categorize themselves in workplace settings. For example, someone who
may act in a (narrowly) self-interested way in an anonymous setting may
act like a good team-member or a helpful colleague in the workplace. Thus,
being pro-social in particular contexts can be part of an assumed identity
that then a¤ects behavior.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these ideas in depth, but we
can adapt our basic framework to illustrate some of their obvious implications
in the context of how motivation and incentives interact. Suppose that I = 2
and that each agent is ex ante identical. There is a defaultidentify called
i = 1 where 1 = 0. We suppose that an agent can adopt an identity
2 =  > 0. This is a person who identies and internalizes the pro-social
goals of the organization that they are working for, i.e., becomes a motivated
agent in the sense of this paper. We will discuss the choice process in more
detail below. To start with, we will suppose that it is costless to acquire
the identify 2 and simply address whether there is indeed a demandfor a
pro-social identity.
To illustrate, we again take the case where the outside option is zero.
Now, with w = 0, the expected payo¤ of an agent when i = 1, the neutral
identity, is V
2
8
whereas for the agent i = 2, who has the pro-social identity,
it is (
V+)
2
8
:
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Hence, it is clear that there are gains to the individual from assuming
a pro-social identity when she works for a public service organization, all
else being equal. We also saw above, that beneciaries also benet. This
observation motivates the idea that it could be worthwhile for an organiza-
tion charged with delivering a public service to commit resources in order to
promote a pro-social ethos among its workforce. Equally, agents may them-
selves be willing to undertake costly actions which create a pro-social identity
if they realize that this actually leads to greater utility. In other words, as-
suming identities can be completely economically rational by allowing people
to adapt to the organization in which they work and get more out of being
a member of it.
What forms might these actions take? Akerlof and Kranton (2005) give
the example of rituals at West Point which are intended to socialize new
recruits into being e¤ective military personnel. Training programs upon
entering an organization which encourage people to see the benets that the
work of the organization does are commonplace and can be understood as a
form of socialization into making employees internalize pro-social objectives.
Doctors who take the Hippocratic oath that we discussed above provide
another example.
But, more generally, there is a question of how identity formation is a
strategic practice rather than an unconscious process of social learning based
on interactions with others. One could illustrate this in a simple way. Imagine
that a rm can invest in motivational capital at pecuniary cost, m, which
a¤ects motivation. We can formally capture this by a function  (m) that
is strictly concave and increasing with 0 ( m) = 0 for some m > 0. To be
concrete, this could reect the amount of resources that go into teaching
medical ethics to doctors. Now the organization which is running the public
service can choose an optimal investment to maximize its project specic
payo¤ given by:
fV +  (m)g2
4
 m:
The rst-order condition for the investment in what we can call motivational
capital, at an interior solution m, is:
0 (m)
V +  (m)
2
= 1:
Since we assume  (m) is strictly concave, the second-order condition for a
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global maximum, 200 (m) +
n

0
(m)
o3
< 0 will hold at m = m. Otherwise,
there will be an corner solution where m = 0 or m = m.
We can see right away that a higher value of V encourages investment
in motivational capital, as does the elasticity of  (m) with respect to m.
However, if there was no moral hazard, and the motivational investment was
chosen to maximize joint surplus of the organization and the employee, the
level of investment would have been higher since the joint expected surplus
is 3[ V+(m)]
2
8
 m. A more interesting and subtle insight is, if organizations
carry out this investment, they may over-invest in motivational capital since
if we were to maximize the employees payo¤, then the rst-order condition
would have been
0 (m)
[ V +  (m)]
4
= 1
which implies a lower level of m given the concavity of m.
While this exercise is very simple (for example, it does not consider the
social aspect of investing in m, investment by the employees, or the role of
competing organizations), it suggests that investment in motivational capital.
Understanding better how motivation in organizations is encouraged as part
of the rms human resource management strategy is an important topic for
future research.
4.3 Intrinsic versus Pro-Social Motivation
Pro-social motivation as we have modeled can be equated with a certain
kind of intrinsic motivation where agents undertake pro-social actions for
their own sake or out of a sense of moral duty. Weber (1922) had the
idea that some actions are undertaken as expressions of value rather than
because of the ends that they achieve. And many outcomes of pro-social
motivation have been explicitly linked to moral considerations. A case in
point is Titmuss (1970) who emphasized donating blood as a pro-social action
based on intrinsic motivation. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) interprets the
behavior of parents in Israeli day care centers as a form of pro-sociality.
Psychologists such as Deci and Ryan (2000, page 56) dene intrinsic mo-
tivation as ..the doing of an activity for its inherent satisfactions rather than
for some separable consequence. When intrinsically motivated, a person is
moved to act for the fun or challenge entailed rather than because of external
prods, pressures, or rewards.They argue that there is considerable evidence
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that such motivation exists. The idea of intrinsic motivation has no direct
link to whether the act being undertaken is pro-social. Indeed, one way to
think of intrinsic motivation is as an act of pure selsh indulgence. This
idea is also distinct because psychologists resist thinking about this as some
kind of instrumental non-pecuniary motivation.
While psychologists have a long history in studying these issues, it is only
recently that economists have begun to study the implications of intrinsic
motivation. Psychological research suggests a continuum between extrinsic
and intrinsic motivation as suggested, for example, in Ryan and Deci (2000)
which, in turn, builds on Deci and Ryans (1985) self-determination theory.
A range of psychological experiments have looked at these di¤erent forms of
motivation. Some economists have now more squarely confronted the idea of
intrinsic motivation and its consequences (see, for example, Frey (1997)).
According to Ryan and Deci (2000), extrinsic motivation comes in four
di¤erent varieties that can be mapped into the approach taken here. At one
extreme there are purely externally motivated rewards as in the standard
economic model discussed above (external regulation). Next comes behavior
that is motivated by self-image or reputational concerns (introjection). In
both cases, an activity is not valued for its own sake and is only a means to
an end. Then there are situations where an agent comes to value an action
and endorses the goals associated with the task (identication). Next, there
is integration where the agents sense of self is congruent with the task in
hand. Intrinsic motivation is then the residual category, which refers to the
inherent enjoyment and satisfaction from the task or its outcome.
One key idea in the intrinsic motivation literature is that incentivizing a
task can lead to crowd out e¤ort. This was conjectured, for example, in the
early work by Titmus (1970) on blood donation. Benabou and Tirole (2003)
have developed a model of intrinsic motivation where performance incentives
are o¤ered by an informed principal who can adversely impact an agents
perception of a task or of her ability. Incentives can be negative reinforcers
in the long run if they serve as negative signals of the principals view of
the task. This contrasts with the core model above where e¤ort always
responds positively to rewards. However, cross-sectionally, the model can
produce something which looks like crowding out specically there will be
a negative correlation between e¤ort and bonuses in a population where i is
varying since bi is higher where i is lower and ei is higher where i is higher
(even when the bonus is endogenously determined).
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4.4 Signaling and Reputation
In this section, we review one particular approach to pro-social motivation
and incentives based on the work of Benabou and Tirole (2006) simplied
and adapted to the framework that we have developed here. In their model,
individuals care about their social reputation or self-respect and rewards or
punishments create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are
performed. What is key for their approach to work is that motivation comes
from pro-social actions generating a public signal that is valuable to the in-
dividual concerned. Creating a reputation for pro-sociality would have a
number of benets. One possibility is that it has market value - for exam-
ple, if an individual who is pro-social is expected to be more trustworthy in
general, a pro-social reputation would command a wage premium by helping
overcome contracting problems in the rm, and as a consequence of this, it
might be a valuable asset in the labor market.28 It could also be that pro-
social individuals have access to better social networks or pool of potential
partners. It is not necessary to be specic about the source of the benet
for the purposes of studying how the reputation-based model works.
We show now how the core model can capture this idea. To this end,
suppose that individuals are in part motivated by a reputational benet of
being recognized as a motivated agent and suppose that there are just two
types with  2 0; 	 with a fraction  in a population having  =  and
the remaining fraction (1  ) having  = 0. Suppose also that the agent
performing the task is a random selection among the population of agents.
In e¤ect, there is a pooling contract where all agents are treated the same.
As before, there are two parts of the compensation, a bonus (b) and a wage
(w).
We will focus on the case where the outside option is zero and where
the xed wage is zero. This will allow us to focus on the determination of
bonus pay and how it is a¤ected by signaling. Let fe0; e1g be the e¤ort of
the non-motivated and motivated agents respectively if they are asked to
perform the pro-social tasks described in the core model. These e¤orts will
be determined in a signaling equilibrium.
The payo¤ of agent an agent with  is
e [b+ ]  1
2
e2 + R (e : e0; e1) (7)
28This parallels the well-known career concerns model of Holmström (1999) where cur-
rent actions reap future career rewards in the form of wage increases.
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where R (e : e0; e1) is the reputational benet from action e and  is a
parameter which represents the strength of the reputational motive. When
choosing e, a given agent takes the choice of other agents (e0 and e1) as given.
We will suppose that R (e : e0; e1) is simply the probability that the agent
is motivated as perceived by those with whom she interacts and can observe
whether or not she is successful in the task that she is assigned to. Hence
R (e : e0; e1) = e ( = 1 : e0; e1) + [1  e] ( = 0 : e0; e1)
where,  ( = x : e0; e1) is the probability that the agent is motivated condi-
tional on project outcome: success (x = 1) or failure ( x = 0). We assume
that those with whom she interacts use Bayes rule to update their beliefs
after observing  given a prior  that she is motivated. This implies that,
given a pair of e¤ort levels fe1; e0g:
 ( = 1 : e0; e1) =
e1
e1 + e0 (1  )
 ( = 0 : e0; e1) =
(1  e1) 
(1  e1)  + (1  e0) (1  ) :
It is useful to dene Z as the average level of e¤ort in the population:
Z  (1  ) e0 + e1:
Then R can be rewritten as
R = 

e
e1
Z
+ (1  e) 1  e1
1  Z

:
The rst-order condition from (7) is:
b+  + Re (e : e0; e1) = e:
Then
Re = 

e1
Z
  1  e1
1  Z

=
 (1  ) 
Z (1  Z)
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using the fact that e1 = Z + (1  )  (while e0 = Z   ). As we can see,
Re > 0, which suggests positive returns from putting in higher e¤ort for the
same level of incentive pay.29
Using the logic of the benchmark model, if society expects an agent to
be pro-socially motivated with probability , and there are no reputational
concerns ( = 0), the bonus would be b = V 
2
. Then from the incen-
tive constraint, e1 =
V 
2
+  = V+(2 )
2
while e0 =
V 
2
: Without any
reputational concerns, and given the fact that bonuses are adjusted for the
fact that with probability , the agent is motivated, motivated agents put
in more e¤ort while unmotivated agents put in less e¤ort compared to our
benchmark model where these types were known and the bonuses were ad-
justed accordingly.
Starting with this benchmark, suppose  is small but positive. From the
incentive constraint, e = b++Re (e : e0; e1) we can see that now both types
of agents will put in higher e¤ort due to reputational concerns. This means,
other than the direct e¤ect of motivation we studied in the benchmark model,
reputational concerns will alleviate moral hazard problems for all types of
agents, irrespective of their level of motivation.
4.5 Status Rewards
The economic implications of the idea that human beings have a craving
for status has been widely studied (see, for example, Frank, 1985). Societies
often create non-pecuniary status rewards as a means of enhancing pro-social
motivation. Older and classical examples of honors are military medals which
are awarded for seless sacrice in battle. What is key to this argument is
that recognition is a positional good which is valuable because it is scarce and
brings social recognition. We now explore how the possibility of granting
a status incentive can enhance motivation. Bradler et al (2016) conduct a
eld experiment which nds that workers who receive better recognition for
performance, apart from any material rewards, work harder.
The formal framework that follows comes fromBesley and Ghatak (2008).30
The principal is now permitted to introduce a purely nominal reward a po-
sitional good to the agent in the event that the project that he is putting
e¤ort into is successful. We think of this is a recognition (e.g., a medal or a
29A more complete treatment could also look at how the optimal level of b will adjust.
30See Auriol and Renault (2008) for a related approach.
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honor, such as best teacher award) being awarded for good performance in
the framework laid out above. While not conned to public organizations,
they are widely used in such contexts, most notably in the military. More-
over such awards are frequently structured to reward wider contributions to
the public good rather than for those who have simply excelled in increasing
their wealth.31
We think now in terms of there being a large number of agents working in
parallel on projects with social returns and that e^ is the fraction of them that
produce successful projects. Other than giving them bonuses, they can also
be awarded an award denoted by  2 f0; 1g with entirely nominal value and
which generates utility of H (e^) where e^ is the fraction of agents in society
who receive the positional good. We assume that He (e^) < 0 and H (e^) = 0
for e^  e where e  1: This formulation says that there is a crowding e¤ect
if everyone gets the positional good then its value goes to zero.32 We will
study a homogenous population where agents are entirely selsh but care
about the status which comes from earning an honor.
We now consider how awarding medals to all agents who produce a pos-
itive output level a¤ects the choice of monetary incentives. To get a simple
closed form solution suppose that:
H (e^) =

   e^ if e^  =
0 otherwise.
We assume  2 (0; 1). Thus, e = = is the critical fraction of agents
producing high e¤ort above which the value of status goes to zero.33 We
31See Frey and Gallus (2017) for an interesting discussion of honours and awards from
an economic perspective.
32It is possible to consider more explicit microfoundations for this preference. Consider a
simple career concerns setting. Suppose that there are high ability types in the population
who always produce high output and a fraction  of the agents is of that kind. Status
(and possibly future rewards) come from being this type. Others are like the standard
agent who produce a positive output with probability e. Then with common e¤ort level e^
among the low ability agents, the probability that the agent is a high type conditional on
having received the award is:

+ (1  ) e^
which is decreasing in e^.
33One possible interpretation of this formulation is, if  = , (1   e^) is the percentage
of workers not succeeding and the relevant group vis a vis whom a successful worker feels
superior to.
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assume that  < V , so that even if an individual is the only person receiving
the award, it is not su¢ cient to motivate him/her to put in the rst-best
e¤ort level.
Since getting an honor depends on how many others receive the honor,
there is now interdependence in decisions. Hence we need to characterize a
Nash equilibrium between the agents in the economy who take e^ as given.
Now
e 2 arg max
e

e [b+H (e^)]  e
2
2

which implies that e = b+H (e^). In this case, solving for e^, yields:
e^ (b) =
 + b
1 + 
which we assume is less than = so that the honor is scarce enough for it to
have value. Assuming that the outside option of the agent is zero, we now
have:
b = arg max
b

 + b
1 + 
[ V   b]

Repeating the logic that lead to the characterization of b and e in the
benchmark model, the optimal contract sets b = V 
2
and the corresponding
e¤ort level is
e =
V + 
2 (1 + )
:
Thus, even though agents are selsh, their belief in the value of the honor is
su¢ cient for them to behave as if they are motivated, and bonuses are lower
by exactly the value of the honor if an agent was the only one to receive it.
However, because there is crowding, i.e.,  > 0, overall e¤ort is lower than
in the case where  is intrinsic pro-sociality. Moreover, a higher value of
crowding makes society worse o¤, as there is less e¤ort for a given amount
of bonus pay.
It is interesting to ask whether society should introduce status rewards for
pro-social behavior. It is clear that there is a trade-o¤. On the one hand,
it allows some reduction in bonus pay where the status award is costless.
However, crowding means that e¤ort is lower since there is now a negative
externality inicted by other agents in society putting in high e¤ort as that
devalues the status award. Comparing the payo¤s to society in both
cases, we nd that a su¢ cient condition for a status award to be valuable is
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
V
> ;i.e., as long as the value of the award is high enough and crowding is
su¢ ciently small.
4.6 Altruistic motivation
As we discussed above, the core of idea of pro-social motivation has an egois-
tic component because individuals care about their own contribution to the
social good. A more conventional view of altruism supposes that behavior
is motivated only by the payo¤s experienced by others. We now explore
the di¤erence between a pure altruism model and the motivated-agents ap-
proach. We model this by allowing agents to attach a weight to the welfare
of the beneciaries.
Motivation is now given by i = i [ V   b] where i 2 [0; 1] reects the
extent of altruism. One immediate di¤erence with the core model is that we
deduct b from the payo¤ to reect that higher nancial bonuses reduce the
surplus of beneciaries. This direct dependence of i on b means that we
need to modify the formal analysis. Specically, the incentive compatibility
condition implies that e¤ort maximizes
e fb+ i (V   b)g   e
2
2
+ w:
The rst-order condition, assuming an interior solution, implies that ei =
fb+ i (V   b)g. With i > 0, increasing incentives does not increase e¤ort
one for one, and if i = 1, there is no e¤ect of incentives on e¤ort! This is
because the agent perceives bonuses as reducing the benets to beneciaries
one-for-one. However, with i = 1, the agent will choose the e¤ort level
which is best for the beneciaries of the service even without being given any
incentives.
Altruistic motivation also changes the participation constraint since an
altruist will care about the project outcome even if she is not selected to be
the agent who actually provides the service. So her utility if she is not the
agent but where an agent j is involved is
u+ eji [ V   bj]  iw
where ej is the level of e¤ort and bj is the incentive pay o¤ered to agent j.34
34The issue is somewhat subtle as this is based on each agent believing that if she is
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To explore the implications of this, we will suppose that all potential
agents are identical so that the subscript on i can be dropped. The partic-
ipation constraint must now be binding now even if u = 0. This is because
the agent will conjecture that the project will take place with another iden-
tical agent even if she is not involved. The only way to guarantee that an
agent comes forward to provided e¤ort is by increasing the xed component
of compensation so that
w = u+
e2
2
= u+
[b+  [ V   b]]2
2
:
Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, altruism actually raises the cost of em-
ploying an agent; she needs to be given the full cost of her e¤ort which
remains true even if  = 1.
To solve for the optimal level of the bonus, note that the objective function
of the principal acting on behalf of the beneciaries is
[b+  [ V   b]] [ V   b]  [b+  [ V   b]]
2
2
  u.
Maximizing this with by choosing b now yields the optimal nancial bonus
equal to
b () = max
(
V
 
1  3+ 2
(1  ) (3  ) ; 0
)
:
Thus raises the possibility that with altruism, no incentive pay is o¤ered and
there is full reliance on altruistic incentives. Indeed this will occur for a
critical value of    where  2 (1=3; 1=2), i.e. if the altruistic motive is
su¢ ciently strong.
4.7 Taking Stock
This section shows that the details for how agent motivation can matter a
lot for the design of incentives. Perhaps this is not surprising as there are
not involved production of the good, then an equally altruistic agent will be. One could
model the entry game in which each potential provider chooses whether or not to put
themselves forward. This game has multiple pure strategy equilibria if the good is not
provided when no agent comes forward. The symmetric mixed strategy solution which
would create a positive probability that the good is not provided although this would be
small in a large population of potential agents.
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many deviations from pure self-interest and there is no reason to expect them
to have common implications. A common theme however, is that standard
implications of self-interest models need modifying. And to make practical
use of the insights from the models requires some insight into the underlying
psychology of pro-social motivation, i.e. knowing what drives that behavior
in particular cases. The personnel economics of pro-social behavior looks
like an interesting eld where empirics and theory can be brought together
and is part of wider agenda aimed at merging insights from psychology into
the economics of organizations (see Kamenica, 2012)
5 Conclusion
This paper has reviewed the literature on the interaction between alternative
models of agent motivation and the use of incentive pay in organizations that
provide goods and services whose returns have a major social component
that is not captured in prots. Such activities are also typically subject
to severe measurement problems regarding outcomes and performance. We
have reviewed di¤erent forms of motivation that have been suggested in the
existing literature and tried to provide a unifying framework for thinking
about them.
The focus has been on developing a theoretical framework that incor-
porates the concept of pro-social motivation in a standard principal-agent
models, and how it interacts with the use of incentive pay . However, the
framework may also be useful in thinking through the implications of prac-
tical e¤orts to utilize and reward actions which have a social component.
There is now a large and growing empirical literature which looks at the
impact of incentives on performance in areas where pro-social motivation is
deemed to be relevant. Moreover, there have been increasing e¤orts to ex-
plore these issues in eld experiments such as Ashraf et al (2014), Berg et
al (2017), Deserranno (2017), Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009) and
Rasul and Rogger (2013). Finan et al (2017) provides an excellent review of
this evidence and Ashraf and Bandiera (2017b) review the literature on the
related issue of how incentives and social relationships interact in economic
settings.
If the world is indeed populated by motivated agents with non-pecuniary
goals then a whole host of questions arise about how to put such motivation
to good use. Although we have applied these ideas to studying incentives,
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there is a wider agenda that studies how organization structure (e.g., for-
prot vs non-prot rms) and external factors, such as market forces and
social norms, shape pro-social motivation and drive selection on motivation to
organizations and sectors.35 There is a whole agenda of unexplored questions
which will help to inform policy towards better delivery of public services
to citizens in a variety of settings. Moreover, there is the potential to
unify the more standard approach to the economics of incentives with more
sociologically and psychologically informed approaches.
35Besley and Ghatak (2017a) use the idea of motivated agents to study the role of social
enterprises alongside more traditional forms of organization, such as for-prots and non-
prots. More work is needed on the forces which a¤ect the dynamics of motivation in
society (see Besley and Ghatak, 2017b for an evolutionary perspective), and what can
foster the adoption of pro-social identities.
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